Lebanon's 'old guard' is still alive

The Daily Star
Monday, August 08, 2005

By Farid El Khazen

The recent parliamentary elections held in Lebanon in May and June came at a
time of drastic change in postwar Lebanese politics. It was the first
parliamentary election held after the withdrawal of Syrian troops, and it
followed the international community's renewed interest in Lebanese politics
embodied in the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559
on September 2, 2004.
The elections were also the culmination of events that marked Lebanese
politics following the prolongation of President Emile Lahoud's term for
three years in violation of Resolution 1559. The status quo that had
prevailed in Lebanese politics since the end of the war in 1990 was
shattered by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on
February 14, followed by approval of Resolution 1595, which established an
international independent investigation commission to look into Hariri's
assassination; and by the "Independence Intifada" that brought together over
a million Lebanese on March 14, from all communities, to demand a withdrawal
of Syria's military and intelligence apparatus.
Notwithstanding these momentous developments, the electoral law that
governed the recent elections was the same one used in the 2000 elections,
and differed little from the electoral laws of the two previous elections in
1992 and 1996, both dictated by Syria. These laws, which created large
constituencies and involved extensive gerrymandering, were designed to
influence the outcome of elections so that they targeted specific political
groups and communities, notably the Christian communities.
Despite repeated calls by several politicians to adopt an electoral law
that would allow better representation and greater competition, no change in
the 2000 electoral law was possible. The international community's
insistence on holding elections according to schedule allowed no time for
any serious revision of the law, and provided an excuse for supporters of
the 2000 law to block a proposal presented by several deputies for an
electoral law based on medium-size districts.
There was relatively little intervention by government authorities in the
elections. Damascus, too, had no hand in the making and unmaking of
electoral lists and alliances, as was the practice before. The elections
were marked by two contradictory patterns: First, competition, took place in
Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon. There, electoral lists engaged in fierce
competition between two broad alliances: lists backed by General Michel
Aoun, who returned to Lebanon in early May after 15 years of exile imposed
by the Syrian-controlled Lebanese government, faced lists backed by Saad
Hariri, the son of the late prime minister, who succeeded his father as
leader of the Sunni community, in alliance with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
and Christian politicians and parties formerly associated with the Qornet
Shehwan gathering.
A second pattern of elections took place in South Lebanon and Beirut, where
the outcome was largely predetermined. In Beirut, where the participation
rate was the lowest in the country, at about 25 percent, eight candidates
out of 19 won their seats uncontested, and deputies on Hariri's list won by
wide margins.
Similarly, in South Lebanon six candidates out of 23 won uncontested. The
alliance between the two major Shiite parties, Amal and Hizbullah,
monopolized Shiite representation and made it almost impossible for a third
Shiite force to emerge as a serious competitor. In North Lebanon, the resort
to sectarian slogans by Sunni religious figures in support of the Hariri
list was an unprecedented development in Lebanese electoral politics. The
elections were also marred by the widespread and uncontrolled use of money.
More than any other parliament in pre- and post-war Lebanon, the 2005
parliament is made up of large parliamentary coalitions headed by leaders
who have near total monopolies over the representation of their respective
communities: Hariri's coalition includes 21 out of 27 Sunni deputies; Amal
and Hizbullah's coalition includes 24 out of 27 Shiite deputies; and seven
out of eight Druze deputies are in Jumblatt's coalition. The most
diversified group of deputies in terms of political allegiances and
alliances is Christian, though Aoun's coalition includes the largest single
agglomeration of Christian deputies (18 out 64).
While the elections brought a large number of newcomers to Parliament,
particularly among groups that were targeted or banned by the
Syrian-controlled Lebanese government, the political process is still
heavily constrained by politicians and parties that have close ties with
Syria and harbor agendas that go beyond Lebanon, notably Hizbullah. In
addition to Syria, Hizbullah is backed by Iran and has the support of Amal
as well as a number of Lebanese politicians.
Lebanon is currently in a transition period after nearly 30 years of Syrian
hegemony, and it will take time for the Lebanese government to exercise
sovereignty fully now that it has regained it. The duration of the
transition period will depend on several developments, some of which are
beyond Lebanon's control. In the short run, the outcome of the international
investigation of Hariri's assassination will have a bearing on Lebanese
politics, perhaps on Syria and, by extension, on Syrian-Lebanese relations.
Moreover, the full implementation of Resolution 1559 concerning the
disarming of Hizbullah and of armed Palestinian groups is the greatest
challenge facing Lebanon in its dealings with the international community.
In the long run, Syrian-Lebanese relations will constitute the major source
of tension facing Lebanon both internally and in its external relations.
The recent elections would have had a greater impact on the political
process had the electoral law been different, for the Syrian-backed Lebanese
"old guard," with its multiple regional agendas, affecting everything from
relations with Iran to the Arab-Israel conflict, retains significant
influence. The elections restructured political alliances but did not usher
in a new era of change. It will take time for Lebanon to find a new
equilibrium, one that disengages Lebanon from regional turmoil.
Farid al-Khazen is a member of the Lebanese Parliament from the Aounist
list, and a professor of political science at the American University of
Beirut. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an
online newsletter.

Copyright (c) 2005 The Daily Star